Societies in Transition
The Caucasus and the Balkans between Conflict and Reconciliation

Jena/Germany
September 27th – October 4th 2015

Programme and application (until July 15th) http://www.jcrs.uni-jena.de

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Summer School 2015
Friedrich Schiller University Jena

Conference Reader
Introduction

Reaching back to the so-called Balkan Wars in 1912/1913, up to the transformation processes that began in the 1980s in the Soviet Union and Europe, the multi-ethnic and multi-religious areas between Europe and the Middle East have witnessed broad social and political upheavals. The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent resurgent nationalist movements during the late 1980s and early 1990s led to ethno-political conflicts related to questions of religion and culture that severely affected and continue to affect both the Balkans and the Caucasus.

The historical backgrounds of the respective countries are reflected in a wide range of conflicts and transformation processes that open up diverse opportunities for reconciliation, including social, historical, religious, political, and psychological trauma/therapeutic approaches.

Twenty-five years after the dissolution of the so-called Iron Curtain we still observe continuing differences in the second-generation historical narratives that support revanchist behavioral patterns and retaliation between neighboring countries.

How can reconciliation and conflict resolution work as a facilitator between education and grassroots-initiatives? How can affected populations adopt more cooperative historical-awareness practices?

This year’s International Summer School (ISS) offers a variety on themes and interdisciplinary approaches to “Conflict and Reconciliation”. Our reader with all lecturers’ and participants’ abstracts offers a first glimpse.

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For further information or help do not hesitate to contact:
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We wish you a pleasant and insightful participation in the International Summer School 2015.
**PROGRAMME 2015**

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<td>ARRIVAL / REGISTRATION</td>
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<td>“The European Role on Reconciliation Policy in the Balkans”</td>
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<td>“Frozen Conflicts: The Challenge for Reconciliation 20 years after Transition”</td>
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<td>“Reinvigorating Cross-Border and Cross Regional Cooperation in South Caucasus: Challenges and Prospects”</td>
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<td>“Reconciliation: A Negotiation Between Anamnesis and Amnesia”</td>
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<td>10.00 – 12.30 pm</td>
<td>Presentation of Research Projects, Panel 1: “Stereotyping or Empathy?: Faith and Emotions in Intra- and Intergroup Reconciliation” (Toropova; Rupar; Mocnik)</td>
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<td>Fieldtrip to Buchenwald, Weimar; guided tour by JCRS PhD Students</td>
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<td>9.00 – 10.30 am</td>
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<td>“The Reunification of Germany and Reconciliation after the GDR: Thuringia and Beyond”</td>
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<td>“Confronting History: The Impact of Collective Memories on Interethnic Cooperation” (Riehn; Marelic; Vukcevic)</td>
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<td>9.00 pm onwards</td>
<td>Social Event at “Bauersfeld Café”, Am Planetarium 5</td>
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<td>Thursday, 01st Oct</td>
<td><strong>10.00 am – 12.30 pm</strong>  WORKSHOP: “Feeling Foreign in a Familiar Land: Reconciliation Between Indigenous and Settler Australians” Dr. Phillip Tolliday</td>
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<td>“External Actors as Catalysts for Rapprochement” (Imaeva; Zagar; Vardishvili; Manojlovic; Lula; Sadaliev)</td>
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<td><strong>8.30 pm Winetasting at a Georgian vintner</strong></td>
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<td>Friday, 02nd Oct</td>
<td><strong>8.00 – 9.30 am</strong>  “Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – Obstacles and Chances for Conflict Mitigation between the three Countries” Paata Zakareishvili (State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality of Georgia), Interpreter: Zaza Bzishvili</td>
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<td><strong>6.00 – 7.30 pm</strong>  Visit of the Documentation Centre “Topography of Terror”</td>
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<td>Saturday, 03rd Oct</td>
<td><strong>9.00 am – 1.00 pm</strong>  WORKSHOP: “Role of History Education in Reconciliation: Identity-based Approach” Prof. Karina Korostelina (George Mason Excellence School of Conflict Analysis &amp; Resolution, George Mason University)</td>
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Reconciliation in Former Yugoslavia

Presentation at the Summer School “Societies in Transition. The Balkans and the Caucasus between Conflict and Reconciliation” in Jena, 30 September 2015

Raphael Biermann

Faculty of Political Science (Friedrich Schiller University of Jena)

Given the legacy of the five wars in the process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution between 1991 and 2001 in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia and the accompanying horrendous war crimes, the dire need for reconciliation to heal the wounds of the past and allow for a future that goes beyond the absence of physical violence and a fragile “stability” is obvious. However, twenty years after the Dayton Accords on Bosnia and Herzegovina, sixteen years after the NATO air campaign in Kosovo and fourteen years after the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia reconciliation has hardly taken root among the societies and ethnic groups in the Western Balkans. This presentation argues that reconciliation faces the risk of failing among almost all of the states and ethnic groups of the region, in particular among Serbs and Albanians, Slavic Macedonians and Albanians, Greeks and Macedonians and also (to a lesser extent) Croats and Serbs. Thus, we risk repeating Tito’s policy of tabooing the legacy of WW I and II, which allowed the ethnic entrepreneurs of the 1980s and 1990s to re-awaken the antagonisms of the past, play the ‘ethnic card’ and prepare their societies for war.

Surely, there were and are attempts of coming to terms with the past, focusing in particular on bringing to justice the war-time elites before the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), created during the Bosnian war to indict and persecute those responsible for the war crimes and thus deter further atrocities. And surely, there are isolated events of political elites willing to excuse (such as in Srebrenica and Dubrovnik) and honorable attempts of NGOs to heal traumatization, uncover the past and bring victims and perpetrators into dialogue. Still, by and large collective denial of the past and deep distrust reigns, coupled with continuing preferences for “other-maligning” and “self-glorifying” among all groups and exclusive thinking along ethnic lines. The enormous post-conflict peacebuilding effort of the international community - the countless mediation attempts during and after the war, the still existing quasi-protectorates
in Kosovo and Bosnia, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the Stabilization and Association Process of the EU since 1999 – was hardly able to inspire reconciliation from the outside. It focused mainly on infrastructure, institutions and refugee return, hardly on a sustained effort to repair and heal inter-ethnic relations. As far as reconciliation is on the political agenda, the focus was and is on retribution, much less on restoration.

Whether the EU accession perspective for the region will also open up a perspective of reconciliation in the long term will depend on the EU and the local elites realizing that the goals of multiethnicity and good neighborly relations can only be attained when a systematic and sustained effort to overcome the psychological remnants of a past that go back to the Balkan Wars of 1913/14 is made. Integrating much more systematically reconciliation into the agenda of the Stabilization and Association Process of the EU would probably be the most effective way to do so. This amounts to a cognitive paradigm shift among the peacebuilders.

The presentation will, as it currently stands, be structured as follows. I will first conceptualize what I understand by reconciliation (and transitional justice) and which instruments are commonly applied along the spectrum of retributive and restorative justice. Turning to the Western Balkans, I will lay the groundwork by discussing the grave legacy of the wars of the 1990s, including its psychological dimension, in order to demonstrate where we come from. Afterwards, the presentation will discuss the major relationships where reconciliation is needed throughout the region, both among and within countries, pointing in particular to Serbs and Albanians, Croats and Serbs and Bosniaks and Serbs. Obviously, Serbia is a strategic reconciliation agent throughout the Balkans. Subsequently, I present the major instruments of reconciliation applied so far and select one pivotal instrument, the ICTY in The Hague, and one of the most appalling cases where reconciliation is needed, the Srebrenica genocide of 1995, for a more in-depth analysis. I follow up with a cautious assessment (due to the paucity of literature on the topic) on where we stand today in terms of reconciliation in the region, based also on some personal experience. Since this assessment is, as said, quite distressing, I end up trying to identify major obstacles for reconciliation in the region and potential for change. This alludes to some dimensions in reconciliation processes which might deserve increased political and academic attention.
The EU, Germany and the Balkans: Motivations, Mechanisms and Measurements in the Promotion of a Path from Conflict to Reconciliation

Lily Gardner Feldman

American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (Johns Hopkins University)

I. Introduction: Framing Points
Conference on the Western Balkans, August 28, 2014:
We agree that today’s conference should provide a framework for a period of four years, during which we will further our endeavours to make additional real progress in the reform process, in resolving outstanding bilateral and internal issues, and in achieving reconciliation within and between societies in the region. We are also united in the aim of enhancing regional economic cooperation and laying the foundations for sustainable growth.

Western Balkans Summit, August 27, 2015:
The Western Balkans region has come a long way since the violent breakup of former Yugoslavia, notably in the areas of political and economic stability, as well as in regional cooperation...While there has been good progress in establishing a web of regional cooperation structures over the last years, more efforts are needed to solve outstanding bilateral disputes. Furthermore, concrete steps from political leaders in the Western Balkans towards lasting reconciliation in the region are necessary. Reconciliation is essential to promote stability and support the creation of an environment in South East Europe conducive to overcoming the legacy of the past.

Joint article by Austrian and German Foreign ministers, August 27, 2015:
The prospect of EU membership has so far been the single most important incentive for the implementation of tough but necessary reforms and for sustained efforts towards reconciliation... Without the Western Balkans, the European Union is clearly incomplete.

II. Significance of the Topic
- Current relevance as route between the Balkans and EU is main passageway for migration from Middle East and Africa to Europe: largest humanitarian crisis since WWII; fundamental challenge to stability, identity and purpose of EU as peace community founded on reconciliation and solidarity.
• Balkans region displays **varieties of conflict**: border disputes; political disputes; minority rights issues; dissolution of Yugoslavia (European Fund for the Balkans), highlighting the problem of multiple layers of conflict requiring sustained attention.

• Region is laboratory for understanding **potential and reality of different forms of reconciliation**: internal and international; practical/pragmatic and psychological/emotional; range and type, involving peaceful coexistence/normalization/ rapprochement/amity.

• Balkans is a window on **different kinds of actors** in transformation from conflict to reconciliation: bilateral (EU member states and Balkans countries) and multilateral (EU; Balkans Regional Cooperation Council); governmental and non-governmental/civil society;EU member states and aspirants; positive (Germany) and negative (Greece; Slovenia; Croatia) EU member states.

• General **role of third parties in transformation**: EU/Germany as model and mediator, as normative, material and shaping power.

• EU/Germany policies entail **wide range of mechanisms**, raising challenge of comprehensiveness and coordination.

• EU/Germany propelled by **variety of motivations/goals**, emphasizing issue of competing objectives.

• Case of EU/Germany and Balkans reveals features of both **success and failure**.

III. **Conflicts Old and New/Importance of Past and Future**

Serb Foreign Minister Statement

• Serbia-Croatia
• Serbia-Kosovo
• Croatia-Slovenia
• Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Macedonia-Greece

IV. **EU/German Motivations**

• Stability
• Prosperity
• Democracy
• Reconciliation

V. **EU Policy and Mechanisms**

• General characteristics: complex, holistic, institutional, structural, short and long-term, range of functional areas, Central and Eastern Europe enlargement model.
Copenhagen Criteria, June 1993; Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, June 2003; Berlin Process, August 2014

- Economic: Stabilization and Association Agreements; Regional Cooperation Council; energy and transportation
- Political: Common Security and Defence Policy: facilitative (Serbia-Kosovo 2013 agreements); stabilizing (BH) through military-led mission; police mission; upholding rule of law missions (Kosovo, Macedonia)
- Youth: dual education system (German model); youth exchange (Franco-German and German-Polish models)
- Commemoration: Srebrenica
- Civil Society Forum

VI. Germany’s Role

- Leadership: 1999 Foreign Minister Fischer’s Peace Plan and military involvement and refugees (from Balkans)
  2014 Chancellor Merkel Berlin Process and 2015 refugee crisis (through Balkans)
- Economic
- Political (2013 Serbia-Kosovo agreements)
- Civil Society: German NGO’s, e.g. Bosch Foundation; German political foundations

VII. Success and Failure and Future Prospects

- Specific policies/programs
- General question of the future of Europe based on the goal of reconciliation: Orban (Christian Europe and homogeneity) vs. Merkel and Tusk (solidarity and tolerance and diversity)
Politics of Insecurity: Cross-border Conflict Dynamics and Security Challenges in Georgia

Kornely K. Kakachia

Ivane Javakishvili Tbilisi State University

National borders exemplify a number of paradoxes: the boundary both separates and unites neighbouring states. The border delimits and defines the state and its territory, and disputes in borderlands can eventually affect international relations and regional stability. In regions like the South Caucasus, where states are weak, there is a possibility for the conflicts of one country to flow over into neighbouring countries, and for states to become entangled with conflicts there.

My presentation explores how the form of such cross-border conflict dynamics affect Georgian-Russian relations. This is done through the comparative analysis of Georgia’s cross-border contacts with Russia, including the present situation in the separatist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The case of the Russia-Georgia divide is important for challenging traditional explanations of foreign policy and for learning possible ways to de-escalate dangerous cross border conflicts.

For the argument it is important to bear in mind the ambivalent role of borders that indeed appear to fade away in the era of globalization while at the same time having become the most frequent reason for violent conflict within states. It’s probably correct to claim that territorial boundaries may now be less important as a barrier to the movement of capital, people and goods, but control of these borders and the territory that they encompass often remains a central goal for nation states and citizens. Monitoring borders raises important questions of cross-border cooperation for scholars and policy makers, which call for profound institutional changes and a reconceptualization of our basic understanding of the symbolic and functional role of borders, borderlands and boundaries. It is widely accepted that cross-border cooperation contributes to the creation of greater opportunities for people in the border regions. Enhanced regional cooperation can contribute to economic development and integration at a grass roots level, as well as improve mutual understanding and confidence building across borders.
But this is not the case in the South Caucasus yet. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Caucasian states’ southern and western borders brought to an end a long period of relative stability and low intensity in international relations. While the newly established states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have a similar past, their perceptions about their futures are divergent. Unresolved problems with the delimitation and demarcation of borders have been an important factor impeding the development of cross-border ties. It seems that instead of boosting cross-border cooperation, the region is becoming an area of apparent rivalry, with isolationist policies and zero-sum game logic serving as guiding principles for the regional actors. Another weakness of failed cross-border cooperation is a lack of homogeneity (cultural, linguistic, ethnic, political, religious, etc.) combined with high political insecurity and visa regimes holding back cross-border communication.

As throughout most of the world, borders in the Caucasus were decided not through local mutual agreement by neighboring state entities, but instead by external imperial powers. Similarly, territorial readjustments have often been the consequence of war, with territorial changes clustered after major wars more than any other event. As a result, in the age of empires, borders served really to mark the extent of military and political power. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave South Caucasian states a unique opportunity; for the first time in the complex history of the region states could determine and codify their fate, including mutual border security arrangements. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (and Russia) share a compact geographic area, many common cultural practices, and a long, interlinked history. Despite these deep ties, cross-border relations and collaborative efforts on a regional scale have diminished significantly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

With this in mind the key note speech will seek to examine attempts to develop and improve cross-border and cross-regional relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation in the aftermath of the 2008 conflict; it will outline the weaknesses of relations and explain the need for a paradigm change by shedding light on current security challenges that are impeding successful cooperation and touching the reasons for diminished cross-border cooperation of the South Caucasus regions related to the nationalist issue over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia’s political and economic sanctions against Georgia.

Bearing in mind Georgia’s geopolitical importance for its neighbouring countries and the still contested border demarcation
between Georgia and Russia a closer look will be taken at recent developments concerning the Upper Larsi Checkpoint, a border with high geostrategic and military relevance being the only direct land route between Armenia and Russia. Having been closed and reopened by Russia in recent years I will point at the wider political and economic implications and repercussions for the region.

I will show how the events concerning the border disputes are related to remaining questions regarding South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in the wider context of Georgian resentment over the continuing Russian pressure and unresolved disputes over customs administration in the separatist regions. I will also trace further developments, such as the first success of negotiations concerning an agreement on trade supervision in relation to the contested regions and Russia’s consequent accession to the WTO.

Eventually, also Georgia’s actual free-visa-regime introduced in 2010 is connected to the respective contested border. Facilitating border crossing for the residents of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and the Republic of Adygea. Georgia, according to officials, aims at meeting “humanitarian and commercial needs” of the wider region with the ultimate vision of paving the way to a “unified Caucasus” that has left behind the ethnic tensions of the Nineties. This policy of former Georgian government, however, is being perceived as a provocation by Russian political circles and considered by critics as a strategic interference into Russia’s internal affairs, as well as a repay to Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Thus, strategies of amelioration of this intricate political situation and options for rapprochement of the two countries will ultimately be in the focus of attention.
Facing Violent Past: Major Dilemmas and the Role of a Common History

Karina V. Korostelina

School for Conflict Analysis & Resolution (George Mason University)

In societies with a recent history of violence, the “past” gives meaning to present events and policies, impacts how the notions of justice and equality are perceived in society, constitute intergroup relations and perceptions, and determine the ways people see the future of their nation. Facing the question of how to deal with a recent violent history and promote reconciliation, recovering societies encounter four major dilemmas:

1. Between critical history that helps to improve the society and monumental history that increases loyalty to the nation and submission to the ruling elite.
2. Between the meaning of history as the “past” and as the “possibility” of events reoccurring.
3. Between remembering and forgetting – What amount of remembering is most efficient for reconciliation?
4. Between investing in remembering or supporting other important social projects.

In post-conflict societies in which political and diplomatic approaches are not always successful, history education can encourage dialogues within and between communities. Common history textbooks encourage future generations of leaders to foster partnerships and good relations with neighbours in their region. While it is very difficult to revise historical narratives in weak states or regions that are still enmeshed in conflict, many political leaders in post-conflict states have recognized that efforts to revise biased historical narratives can help heal traumas and improve the relationship between two former enemies. Once violence subsides and states become more secure and confident, citizens are better prepared to examine their history with more scrutiny (Newsom 1999). Thus, teaching multiple narratives through history curricula might be one of the most effective ways of trauma healing and reconciliation.

The seminar offers a look at some notable common history projects that have been launched in an effort to help encourage reconciliation between societies that have emerged from recent conflict. In addition to revealing the various partnerships and materials that have resulted
from such international collaborations, the seminar highlights some of the challenges and successes associated with each of these projects.
Reunification of Germany and Post-GDR Reconciliation: Thuringia and Beyond

Martin Leiner

Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena)

This lecture does not follow the standard format. It builds upon current JCRS work related to Thuringia’s dealing with its own history (1945 to 1989). Students are invited to participate in the process of scholarship - adding to the class with their own insights on course material.

The first part is dedicated to JCRS’s general principals of approach: The Hölderlin perspective, transdisciplinary work, the importance of media and communication, as well as other global and comparative approaches.

The second part introduces the practice and benefits of both bottom-up and top-down approaches, as well as working independently or within mixed groups in protected space. Scholarship on the GDR period requires critical understanding of previous approaches as well as specific data-collecting and data-interpreting skills for properly treating narrative materials from witnesses of the GDR and post-GDR period. This part also develops specific aspects of reconciliation such as intergenerational reconciliation, the importance of historical examples, models, symbols, external actors, legal concepts (e.g. right to receive a just memory), and other concepts.

The third and final part takes the form of informed discussions about the situation in the former GDR, as well as about present-day problems of reconciliation. This third part allows for deeper focusing on issues that have emerged during the first two parts.
Frozen Conflicts: The Challenge for Reconciliation 20 Years after Transition

Christo Thesnaar

University of Stellenbosch (South Africa)

This paper will contribute to the discussion on what defines the concept ‘frozen conflict’. The focus of this particular paper is to explore whether this concept, in its narrowest definition is applicable to post conflict situations. The purpose is to understand if the temporality of the post conflict situation (20 years after their transition) does not broader the way ‘frozen conflict’ is defined and in doing so provide a way through the frozen conflict.

In the traditional sense of the word and within the theory of international relations, a frozen conflict is described as a situation in which active armed conflict has been brought to an end, but no peace treaty or other political framework resolves the conflict to the satisfaction of the combatants. Therefore, legally the conflict can erupt again at any moment, creating an environment of insecurity and instability. This term has been commonly used for post-Soviet conflicts, other perennial territorial disputes, conflicts in the Balkans, Cyprus and the conflict on the Korea peninsula to name a few. As Peet (2008) explains these conflicts are called frozen due to the fact that “a string of nasty small wars have been settled not through peace deals but simply by freezing each side’s positions.”

There are numerous examples of studies that confirm the transmission of trauma and memories to post-conflict generations. The unhealed traumas of the past has the potential to capture the future and in the extreme destroy the next generation(s) by reinforcing the identity of particular ethnic, racial, or religious groups. The frozen conflict can have a devastating effect on the next generation(s) in particular if destructive memory is continuously been kept alive by the different actors of the post conflict generation. In this way a frozen conflict can feed into the trans-generational trauma.

This paper is an attempt to broaden the understanding of the concept ‘frozen conflict’ in order to search for a way through the frozen conflict. The paper will specifically engage with the South African context who fits into the temporal description. Twenty years have passed since the first and free democracy election, the adoption of a new constitution and the establishment of a Human Rights Commission in South Africa. It is also 15 years since the completion
of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) who was tasked to publically deal with the truth of South Africa’s past and to assist the nation to move to the future as a united nation. Despite the establishment and implementation of the TRC by the state in the aftermath of apartheid (for a period of two years), very few if any systematic, state-supported, civil-supported or religious supported processes derived from the TRC to implement the findings of the TRC in order to facilitate reconciliation and healing. This culminates to the fact the different actors (political, cultural and religious) did not seem to pick up the baton to find ways to break through the frozen conflict. Reasons for this predicament could be amongst others related to struggle fatigue (trauma) as a result of the great impact of their commitment to freedom and democracy. In this regard trauma leads to passivity and apathy, on issues of justice, peace, restitution and reconciliation. Within a religious context such as South Africa it was to be expected that the religious society formed part of a united and active citizenry fighting apartheid. Throughout history faith communities played a fundamental role within the country including either creating or dismantling apartheid. It is as if religious apathy has hijacked the process of reconciliation and endorsed the notion of ‘frozen’ conflict, paralyzing the present, and an inability to work towards a united future. As a consequence, reconciliation has almost disappeared off the agenda of faith communities causing a vacuum in the process of dealing with the trauma of the past and moving towards reconciliation and healing. This contribution will focus on how the religious society can address this vacuum caused by the “frozen” conflict of the past in order to regain its commitment to reconciliation and to contribute to the development of responsible and realistic reconciliation processes to break through the frozen conflict.

Workshop:

“Dealing with the Past: Is Remembrance, Trauma and Memory an Obstacle or Catalyst for Reconciliation?”

Facing the current challenges of a lack of reconciliation and unity in many post conflict societies and the impact thereof on the next generation(s) this workshop will attempt to add to the trans-disciplinary discourse on cultural trauma and collective memory in order to find a way to collectively deal with the past traumas in a constructive way. It argues that the concepts of cultural trauma and collective memory are significant in dealing with the traumas of the
past in order to create a collective memory which imply taking responsibility for the present and the future. It further introduces a collective pastoral hermeneutics to assist all actors to take responsibility for the past by embodying a memory process with the ‘other’ in order to transform the past, within the present for the future.

Although the workshop will use the South Africa process as a backdrop to the discussion it will still be applicable to the processes within the Balkan countries. The past injustices still has an influence today (frozen conflicts) and are therefore still obstructing the process of growing together for a peaceful future.

By means of selected examples, the workshop examines the relation between reconciliation and the traumas of the past. Examples of the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (TRC) within South Africa and current examples in the region of the Balkans will be used as a starting point.

The workshop will be an interactive workshop based on discussions of material presented at the workshop. If participants want to read background material on the focus of the workshop they could (not compulsory) acquaint them with the following material:

Reconciliation: A Negotiation between Anamnesis and Amnesia

Phillip Tolliday
St Barnabas’ Theological College (Australia)

That reconciliation is a good thing and that it is to be preferred and endorsed is an assumption that most would be happy to take for granted. That all should be reconciled is a wide-ranging sentiment, appealing to former perpetrators no less than to victims, albeit for rather different reasons. Reconciliation is a core assumption, but one, I suggest, that resists exactitude in definition. Ironically this is its strength, though perhaps also its weakness.

Remembering and forgetting, anamnesis and amnesia, direct our attention to the past, though in the case of situations requiring reconciliation, the past intrudes all-too-easily into the present and threatens the future. An old Yugoslav aphorism records that: ‘The future is not hard to predict, but the past is always changing.’ The seeming malleability of the past is the consequence of memories, or narratives, and of histories. The plurality of voices about the past avers that ‘this past, this one, is the truth.’

It has been said of the past that it is a ‘foreign country,’ for ‘they do things differently there.’ Not so in a post-conflict environment. Rather, we should find ourselves thinking that the past is a contested country and one with which we are uncomfortably close. And as for doing ‘things differently’- well that, of course, is the nub of the problem. We fear that we may not be able to do things differently, and thus we place our hope in reconciliation; that the present and thereby the future may indeed be different from the past.

To ask, ‘How much memory is too much and when is it too little?’(Verjeda), will allow us to discuss the sometimes too-readily-presumed nexus between reconciliation and truth. Transitional justice mechanisms such as trials and truth commissions, through their evocation of memory and testimony, seek to uncover the truth of what happened. The assumption is that knowing the truth will lead to reconciliation. But, as Ignatieff has asked: will the truth make us free? Might it not instead drive us deeper into despair and anger? What is this truth about which we speak? Are we restricting our purview to the facts, some of which were unknown, but many of which were already suspected? Or does the truth mean something more than this?

The weight we lay upon reconciliation is considerable. It is little wonder that it has been interpreted as a complex ‘multi-levelled
process that is best understood as disjunctured and uneven’ (Verjeda). Reconciliation is hardly a free-floating concept, but is surrounded by a teeming cluster of words, ideas, and practices such as justice, truth, history, amnesty, forgiveness, impunity, apology, harmony, consensus, vengeance and resentment. Each one of these connects with and gives form to reconciliation in labyrinth-like ways. But can they show us whether or not reconciliation is actually taking place? And where would we look? Are we referring to interpersonal reconciliation, or reconciliation within a nation, or between nations? Weinstein and Stover (2004) have suggested that reclamation best expresses the meaning of reconciliation in the post-conflict environments of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia – their reason: it [reconciliation] is a ‘murky concept with multiple meanings.’

Murky though it may be, elusive though it certainly is, discernible where people who were formerly polarised from each other begin to treat one another with mutual respect; reconciliation is both event and process. It weaves together the principled and the pragmatic in accordance with specific contexts. It is replete with the idealistic language of forgiveness, harmony, closure and peace; yet the pragmatic art of compromise is likely to yield better results than the fervour of the purist. In some places more remembrance is required to prevent the past from slipping into oblivion—only to re-visit us when we least expect it—while in other situations a little forgetting might be in order, as Amos Elon once cautioned his readers.

Workshop

Feeling Foreign in a Familiar Land

Australia has been described, perhaps ironically, as ‘the most godless place under heaven.’ Christianity has always proven to be a rather awkward graft on the Australian culture. Australians have always, it seems, preferred war and sport, and it is these, rather than religion, or literature or science, that continue to animate the popular imagination. The nearest thing we have to a civic religion is the celebration of Anzac Day, which seeks to commemorate the landing of Australian troops on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915. Every school child is inducted into this story, which is nothing less than a national narrative. It answers the quest, at least in the minds of many people, for a useable past that can weld the nation into one. This would be a significant achievement if it could be brought about, because it has become increasingly apparent that the nation is not at one. For at least the last generation, if not for longer, indigenous Australians have been proclaiming that ‘White Australia has a Black History.’
In this workshop I seek to outline the two histories. We will look at how they differ and also whether the quest for a unified history is (a) achievable, and (b) desirable. The two lenses through which we will approach the so-called history wars will be the discussions around Native Title (i.e., the issue of land rights for Indigenous people) and the Stolen Generations (i.e., Aboriginal children forcibly removed from their families).

If time permits we will discuss the issue of moral agency that is posed by the history wars. Working from Paul Muldoon’s article ‘Thinking Responsibility Differently: Reconciliation and the Tragedy of Colonisation,’ we shall seek to engage with Muldoon’s thesis that ‘viewed as a political institution, tragedy can help to illuminate the exclusions we make in our accounts of what we owe to others and the limitations of our modern ethical vocabulary for dealing with the past.’ Muldoon’s argument is that in Greek tragedy the spectator was drawn into the drama; correlatively, the bystander is never aloof or uninvolved – there is a moral dimension to the bystander regardless of whether he or she is vulnerable to legal culpability.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – Obstacles and Chances for Conflict Mitigation between the Three Countries

Mr. Paata Zakareishvili

State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality

Overview of the Past and Current Developments

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, political, economic and social fragmentation of the Caucasus region became irreversibly stronger. Unfortunately, these processes could not prevent armed confrontation. Yet, the fragmentation is still ongoing and the threat of new conflicts, that may constantly harm regional and global security, remains.

Energy policy is the most important factor for which the Caucasus region is featured into the centre of attention on a global stage. However, this is not the sole reason which determines the interest of the international community towards the region.

Twenty years have passed since three countries of the South Caucasus region have regained their independence. In the very first years of their freshly gained independence, a number of armed confrontations broke out on ethno-territorial grounds. None of these conflicts has been resolved so far. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is essential amongst them, but this conflict is not the only one.

The armed confrontation between Russia and Georgia in 2008, which lasted for five days, has further exacerbated the situation in the region, demonstrating how fragile peace in the South Caucasus is and how defenceless it remains against both the internal and external threats.

Considering these factors, the interest of the international community, including the western countries, towards the Caucasus originates from its precaution as well – to avoid escalation of regional developments into full-scale conflicts, especially against the background of hotbeds. Even though, the international community and the European Union primarily, made an effort to stop the armed confrontation between Russian and Georgia back in 2008, a number of factors still prevents durable stability in the region.

Challenges and Opportunities in the Region

Divergence of political and strategic interests of the South Caucasus countries is the reason for which one cannot even discuss the integration processes among the three countries of the region:
Armenia is moving towards developing a strategic partnership with Russia. This implies deepening cooperation and establishing a collective security regime.

Azerbaijan tries to maintain a moderate, balanced policy along its path to Euro-Atlantic integration, employing the Turkish factor.

All three countries of the South Caucasus have strained relations with their powerful neighbours:

So far, Turkey and Armenia fail to establish diplomatic relations.

Georgia has ceased diplomatic relations with Russia after 2008 War, in response to Russia’s unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a part of the latest developments, the Russian Federation has intensified the installation of barbed wire fences and artificial barriers in the occupied territories of Georgia, later taking a step to their annexation though concluding so called “treaties” with these regions.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are far from ideal. The presence of Azerbaijani provinces in Iran constantly drags the relations of the two countries into crisis.

Deriving from these developments, there is no sustainable and reliable security system in the region – each country is positioned into different, often contradictory or opposing security systems.

Furthermore – social, political and economic conditions in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan actually diverge:

Economics of Azerbaijan is essentially based on its profit from the exploitation of natural resources.

Economics of Georgia is depended on the transit of goods, development of tourism and services.

Taking into account all of the factors mentioned above, many analysts put a question mark under the political concept “region” for defining this area. There are no other sings of political, social or economic consolidation apart from its geographic alignment.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the most dangerous in terms of territorial disputes across the South Caucasus. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are well-equipped to counter any prolonged military conflict. And if materialized, it will seriously paralyze the region.

Georgia’s policy in South Caucasus aims to develop friendly relations and close ties with its regional neighbours, and also to strengthen the economic policy.

Georgia maintains durable friendly relations with its both neighbouring states. Nevertheless, tensions between Baku and Yerevan are only increasing.
• Georgia is a key transit country for the transportation of natural resources of Azerbaijan to Turkey and elsewhere to Europe. Correspondingly, bilateral strategic ties for political advantage and cooperation between the two countries has gained geopolitical dimension.

• Besides, the main route to connect Armenia with the outer world runs across the territory of Georgia.

• For the period of last three years, Georgia tries to normalize its relations with Russia. The policy has sparked the perception of a secure and sustainable development within the population, which is the achievement of the new Government. Georgia participated at the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi; Georgia is ready to cooperate with Russia in the issues of North Caucasus.

• Turkey is one of the key players in the region. Bilateral relations between Turkey and Georgia have considerably expanded within the last two decades. Turkey has achieved an indispensable economic position in Georgia and Azerbaijan. This is a segment on which Russia is loosening its grip in the South Caucasus steadily and irreversibly. Turkey is committed to respect territorial integrity of Georgia and Azerbaijan. But it is also clear, that having a rival in the region in the face of Turkey, is not in the interests of Russia.

Prospects for Future

Considering the factors mentioned above, there are cross-cutting economic and political interests of various countries in the region. As far as in a number of cases these interests essentially clash, the region remains vulnerable to threats; separatist hotbeds put weight to the subject as well.

The United States, the European Union, Turkey and Iran are critically important for external stabilization. However, these axes cannot bring any benefit if they do not counter the driving moves for separatism. Support of democratic processes in the region is viable especially with active engagement and close cooperation of the west. Success in this direction is one of the prerequisites for internal stability of the region, where the democratic processes have a chance create peace and security.
Research Projects Abstracts

Panel I (September 29th)  
“Stereotyping or Empathy?: Faith and Emotions in Intra- and Intergroup Reconciliation”

Maria Toropova

The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Process of Conflict Transformation in Eastern and South-eastern Europe (incl. South Caucasus)

The conception of Jürgen Habermas on the post-secular society as well as the Soft Power theory of Joseph Nye and the symphony\(^1\) theory of the Orthodox tradition serve as theoretical premises for the project. Despite secular recognition, that religion should belong to the private sphere of individuals; nowadays one can observe the revitalization of religions in the social and political context. Russia is a unique case in the post-Soviet space. On the one hand, Russia is a legal successor of the Soviet Union, searching for the ideological compass and trying to reconstruct its own identity. On the other hand, even after the collapse of the USSR Russia has always singled itself out as one of the superpowers with “privileged interests” in some regions, first of all in the CIS.

Russia strives to lead the transition and reconsolidation of the former Soviet republics by means of both hard and soft power. Bearing in mind that over the past decade the former Soviet space has become an area of constantly escalating frozen conflicts, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has started to play an increasingly important role in the formulation and implementation of the Russian external policy in the former Soviet space. This process has been taking place both at the micro- and the macro-levels and raises the following research questions:

1) To what extent does the ROC contribute to the conflict transformation in Eastern and South-eastern Europe (incl. South Caucasus)?

\(^1\) Symphony is an originally Byzantine model of state-church relation, which presupposed active interactions and dialogue between church and state. Symphony is accepted as an ideal model of church-state relations in the Orthodox tradition.
2) What are the political and cultural consequences of the above mentioned process?

The case study covered the conflicts between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine. The dynamics of the conflicts’ transformation in the post-Soviet space due to the mediation of the ROC and its political and cultural aftereffects were analysed from a qualitative perspective. The qualitative analysis was based on the evaluation of relevant documents and official statements as well as on the results of interviews conducted with the experts in the field.

I rely in my research upon the notion that conflicts in Eastern and South-eastern Europe (incl. South Caucasus) are relational, interdependent and non-static. Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Russians have historically belonged to the ROC, the ROC distanced itself from the nationalistic rhetoric and emphasizes the multi-ethnic character and great national diversity of its followers. Moreover, The ROC possesses extensive resources and a wide network in the former Soviet space. Therefore Hypothesis 1 may be worded as follows: The ROC contributes to the conflict transformation in the post-Soviet space even if Russia is not involved in the conflict directly. I conclude that the involvement of the Russian state is of particular importance for the efficiency of the ROC in the mediation process.

Despite the official religious impartiality of Russia, the ROC strives to arrange its relations with the state in accordance with the ideals of symphony. It is from this assumption that Hypothesis 2 emerged: Despite the constitutional separation between church and state, there are wide interactions between the Russian state and the ROC in the domain of peace initiatives, which determines the process of conflict transformation in the post-Soviet space, which founded its confirmation in the analyses. Moreover, the ROC strives to more interactions with the state concerning the issue of its Canonical Territory2 in order to preserve the exclusive role of the ROC in this space and strengthen its role for identity reinvention. Hypothesis 3, rising from the assumption that the role of the soft power has dramatically increased, is: The role of the ROC affects not only the construction of the new external political vector in Russia, but also the direction of political developments in Eastern and South-eastern Europe. This hypothesis was only partially confirmed.

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2 The ROC has a complex notion of canonical territory (a region where the ROC positions itself as the only legitimate Orthodox structure). It includes post-Soviet space, with the exception of Armenia and Georgia, but including China and Japan.
This hypotheses-check means that non-governmental organizations could be both competitive with and complementary to state actors, and could greatly affect the whole social, cultural and political agenda of the region. Religious institutions could perform both, a positive and a destabilizing factor for the security agenda and therefore their impact on the state and its transformation, society and security should be carefully analysed in accordance with legal and geopolitical reasons of related states.

Mirjana Rupar

Facing History - the Role of Intergroup Contact and Intergroup Emotions in the Process of Reconciliation

“(…) since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.” - The Preamble to the Constitution of the UNESCO

The number of conflicts has been rising on a stable trend (Harrison and Wolf, 2012) marking the 20th century with the highest number of conflicts including severe genocides such as the ones in Rwanda, Armenia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a consequence of a formal resolution of the conflict and changing relationship between the conflicted parties, a process of reconciliation starts (Kelman, 2007, 2010). Reconciliation can be defined as a mutual acceptance by adversary groups with the aim of changing the psychological orientation among them (Staub, 2006). The first goal of reconciliation is making a new plan that will serve as a foundation for a stable and lasting peace (Handl, 1997). The second, a more challenging goal, is preparing society members to be a part of that newly created society, characterized by mutual recognition and acceptance (Bar-Tal & Benink, 2001).

According to Bar-Tal (2000) psychological processes of reconciliation include numerous acts such as promoting peace and mutual trust or changing societal goals, but also changing beliefs about involved groups and beliefs about their intergroup relations. In order to achieve these acts it is necessary to implement psychological interventions that include a set of activities modifying individual or group’s behavior, emotional states and feelings (Ballou, 1995). In post conflict societies a great number of these interventions is based on the Intergroup Contact Theory (e.g., Cairns & Hewstone, 2002). According to this theory contact between ingroup and outgroup members is a powerful tool in reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations (Allport, 1954). Numerous studies have reported positive effects of intergroup contact on intergroup relations (for meta-analysis see
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and the prevalence of positive over negative contact (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Graf, Paolini, & Rubin, 2014). However, when it comes to segregated areas, especially the ones that are characterized as conflict or post conflict zones, the opportunities for direct contact are limited and so, indirect forms of contact are more important (Hewstone et al., 2008).

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country that 20 years after the war is still struggling with territorial divisions, unequal ratios of ethnic groups across the country and ethnically segregated schools. People have a minimal opportunity for direct, personal contact with other ethnic groups and knowledge about other group members is mainly based on information that they hear in schools, from parents or see in media. In line with one part of my research interests is in domain of direct and especially indirect contact such as one through media, or through friends or family which highly influences ingroup norms of behavior. In societies where the opportunity for direct contact is minimal it is necessary to explore effects of indirect contact and understand better its underpinnings.

As schools are segregated and media in Bosnia and Herzegovina mirror the “ethnic polarization and territorial fragmentation of the country” people are rarely exposed to the different side of the story of the war and usually are not aware of the atrocities done by their ethnic group. Following these facts it is necessary to explore how representations of the past affect present different cognitive and especially emotional states and how they are associated with process of reconciliation. Emotions have a powerful influence on human behavior and their power seems to amplify in intergroup context (Bar-Tal, 2000). Smith (1993) argues that individuals experience emotions about their personal actions and interactions, but also about of their ingroup and their relationships to outgroups. I am interested in how people react when they are confronted with transgressions done by their ethnic group and how these reactions are associated with processes of reconciliation such as willingness to forgive or accept responsibility. Facing ingroup transgressions can elicit different moral emotions, but also different moral engagement and disengagement strategies such as empathy or dehumanization (Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009) that can lead to opposite outcomes. My current research is focused on finding an effective way of facing ingroup transgressions that could decrease use of moral disengagement strategies and have positive effects on intergroup relations. Focusing on processes that could mediate this relation, special attention within my research project is being given to the role of morality, perception of collective victimhood and group based emotions, especially shame and guilt.


Graf, S., Paolini, S., & Rubin, M. (2014). Negative intergroup contact is more influential, but positive intergroup contact is more common: Assessing contact prominence and contact prevalence in five Central European countries, *547*(August), 536–547.


**Nena Mocnik**

»I will not raise my child to kill your child«: The Impact of Collective Trauma in Women Survivors' Families and its Effects in (Un) Successful Reconciliation Processes in Further Generations

The following project proposes investigation of intergenerational (mothers-children) effects of collective trauma on reconciliation processes. The study case is Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During the war in the Balkans in the 90’s, women together with children and elderly presented the largest group of affected civilians (Helsinki Watch 1993, Amnesty International 1993, Stiglmayer 1994, UNFPA 2010, Peace Women, Women for Peace 2012). In the focus of this study are women survivors, who were exposed to different forms of radical violence, from torture in detention camps to massive rapes, but were able to (re)establish their family life after the war. We want to build the study on the hypothesis that despite the fact that feminist scholarship on traditional and essentialist representations of gender roles, particularly motherhood and wifehood (see for instance Helms 2013), has contributed numerous critical reflections, women as mothers and family breeders are the social reality in many non-
urbanized areas still nowadays. Women in rural areas keep preserving the traditional roles of mothers and family breeders and believe in their “big impact on the early upbringing of their children” (in personal conversation, Mostar 2013). Besides, if women in post-war, reconciliation processes are usually not so much concerned about grandiose projects of state-building, national interests and military strategies,” (Spasić 2001, 350), they certainly do have the power in critical and reflected engagement as the “the pillar of the family home, the organizing center of family daily life and interactions” (Spasić, ibid). Sorensen (1998, iii) in her study of women and post-conflict reconstructions figures out, how “women probably contribute more than government authorities or international aid to reconciliation, reviving local economies and rebuild social networks.” By moving away from the most acknowledged representation of women as silent and powerless victims, we find evidence of their involvement in projects initiated and driven by them and/or in activities in which they work in equal roles alongside men” (Jordan 2003, 239). Therefore, if we assume that women do have an important role in raising and socializing processes of their children, and as recorded, a great majority, especially those who were raped, do suffer from a post-traumatic syndrome disease, this study wants to investigate how traumatic memory influences family education on war crimes, victimhood and perpetrators. Elissa Helms (in 2013, 136), describes the dialogues with women she worked with:

“If they /women/ don’t teach their children tolerance, but instead obsession with the past, prejudice and intolerance, those kids, especially boys, will turn out that way /violent and full of hatred/.”

After being ethnically cleansed, rural communities are hardly getting in touch with different ethnic groups, and the particular war images and the legacy remain in the domain of households, siblings and close, usually same-ethnic groups' friends. At least 50 schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina are reported to be “two schools under one roof”, schools based on ethnic segregation of pupils that are taught separate curricula. This means that a great majority of new generations is subjected to the intolerant, ethnically isolated and ideologically overfed for one or another reason. School system based on teaching division through geography, history and mother tongue, is one of the worst examples of segregation in Europe, affecting and producing a new generation ripe for post-war nationalistic manipulation. Family, therefore, may provide the only constructive source for the successful future ethnic coexistence and provide the tolerant and hate-free environment. But what if the traumatic experience of the women-mother cannot be forgiven and family becomes the main source of the future ethnic hatred? By researching those questions, this study wants
to understand the relationship between traumatic experience of survivors and potentials in both, reconciliation and/or ethnic hatred, learnt in the family circles.
Panel II (September 30th)

“Confronting History: The Impact of Collective Memories on Interethnic Cooperation”

Sonja Riehn

Children of the 90s. An Exhibition Project as one Approach to an Alternative Remembrance in Croatia?

Already the term *Homeland War* (*cr. Domovinski rat*) which is used in Croatia for the period of wars from 1990 until 1995 emphasizes the high emotional and symbolical value of this war for Croatia. The war times are not only seen as a part of the Yugoslavian succession wars, but as a war of independence and an important event of the foundation of an independent Croatian State. Therefore, the Homeland War is an important focal point of the Croatian national identity. The dominant official memory discourse on the Homeland War in Croatia is based on the assumption, that Croatia did only defend itself and the military actions in the 1995s were legal and legitimate methods. Since the acquittal of the two Croatian generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač from the ICTY (*International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia*) in November 2012 the narrative of having fought a fair and legitimate war and being a victim increased. The freedom of two individuals was seen as freedom for the whole country and was interpreted as being free of guilt (cf. BOHNET et al 2013: 15).


It is assumed that commemorative speeches are as an annually repeating ritual sustainably forming the memory discourse of a society. They can be seen as a part of the collective memory of a society. Therefore, they are constructing political and social reality as well as collective identity. The analytical centre of study were eleven selected political memorial and celebratory speeches of Croatian politicians in the last ten years on the topic of the Homeland War. The methods of study were based on Critical Discourse Analysis from Vienna School, particularly Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak and their *discourse-historical approach* (cf. WODAK 1998, REISIGL 2007). The focus of analysis was set on how a national identity and a particular collective memory on the 1990s are produced within the selected speeches. The most important question of the analysis was, if the speeches deliver space for joint rethinking and joint remembrance of the war times in
1990s or can they be seen as a further example of one-sided commemoration and a one-sided memorial discourse in Ex-Yugoslavian countries?

The most important results: First, the analysis showed that the Croatian Homeland War is seen as the one important event of foundation and it is assumed that without the war there would be no Croatian State. The Croatian Homeland War is an important focal point of the national Croatian identity and therefore an important focal point for today’s and probably for future politics. The remembrance on the war is a way of the permanent reconstruction of the national identity. That is why the past has to be legitimate and this one truth about the Homeland War has to be maintained in the present and protected for the future. Second, the analysis of the speeches showed that it is not only some memory on the Homeland War, but a certain, the true memory, which has to be protected. And this memory is based on the assumption, that Croatia did only defend itself and the military actions in the 1995 were legal and legitimate methods. Third, the misery of the Others, the Serbs in Croatia, is not mentioned in even one of the analysed speeches. Their destiny of emigration, displacement and the loss of their homes is not officially mentioned or remembered. It would destroy the official remembrance of the Homeland War. But this contains the danger of denying and downplaying the crimes on Serbian people in the war times. And even worse, to accept their displacement (cf. WÖLFL 2013: 68). The Serbian minority or Serbian population is not only physically excluded from the annual memorial occasions, but also linguistically.

Conclusion: The memorial occasions including the political memorial speeches can be seen an annually repeating ritual of selective remembrance. As long as the Croatian government does not accept responsibility for its own crimes during the 1990s and not all victims are officially recognized as victims, no Croatian government, irrespective of its political wing, will find a new approach and a new handling of the wars from the 1990s. Since the state-supportive remembrance is more an obstacle to reconciliation than a catalyst, the role of civil society is even more important in Croatia. That is why other versions, also private memories, have to be made more visible. How can the Croatian memory discourse be shaped more versatile?

Part 2: An Exhibition Project as one Approach to an alternative Remembrance in Croatia?
Out of three reasons the one-sided state-supportive remembrance on
the Homeland War in Croatia is worrying: For once, the one-sidedness of the state-supportive remembrance averts a critical controversy with the own past and the nationalistic-conservative narratives. Secondly, the over-emphasizing of the Croatian victims and the not-mentioning of the Serbian victims is leading to a stagnation of a common dialog over the war past. The more the War is glorified in Croatia, the harder is an approach from Serbian side to a perception which both sides can accept (cf. WÖLFL 2013: 70) Plus, a change of mentality in Croatian society seems hard of not only impossible if there is a permanent visualization of this one version of the past. This is where the exhibition project wants to draw on: By strengthening ways of remembrance of the civil society.

**Project idea:** Up to now the rough project idea is a transcultural, participative exhibition, which brings the Children of the 1990s in Croatia and Serbia (maybe also Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) together. The exhibition project involves biographical interviews, a workshop and an interactive exhibition opening. The aim of the project idea is to get youngsters who were born in the 1990s as well as adults that lived their childhood and youth through the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s together. In this way the project is including all personal memories of the youngsters, no matter from which ethnic or religious group and helps dealing with the past by looking together into the future. The target group – the *Children of the 90s* are not only those who lived their childhood and youth in the 1990s and have active memories on the events, but the project also wants to include actively those who were born in the 1990s and only know the events through media, school or personal stories of family members. The main goal is an exchange of generations, an exchange of memories of stories. Plus, the project wants to support a dialogue with the public. The project draft is still in progress. One very important precondition is sustainability through the link with local initiatives and NGOs (e.g. the Centre for Civil Courage, Centre for Women War Victims).

Vicko Marelci

**Caves, Concerts and Comedy - Creative Conflict Resolution in the Alpen-Adria Region**

How can we best educate youth about history while surfing steadily on the stormy waves of memory on the Adriatic? My paper will first shed light on the borderland region’s tempestuous past. I shall then trace the attempts of government, regional and NGO initiatives in helping to come to terms with a turbulent past that has included shifting borders, changing identities and population movements in an
area that moved successively between different empires, states and ideologies within less than a lifetime.

Like in many borderlands, geography has played a role as much as history in the Alpen-Adria region. Above Trieste, the largest port on the Adriatic, the Alpine barrier fades for a few kilometres to just 600 meters above sea level, creating the crest line of Postojna. This feature made it the shortest and lowest transit route to the European interior in the whole 1,300 mile stretch of mountains between the Bosporus and the Rhone Valley break. The Postojna doorway is where the Mediterranean comes closest to Mitteleuropa. The area became a junction of people and their competing claims. At the dawn of the 20th century, the Eastern Adriatic was where three of Europe’s major peoples met, Italian, German and Slav, all who harboured historic claims to the region.

My history PhD starts in 1915, the year the Adriatic became the object of the Triple Entente’s purchase of Italy’s military services in the First World War. As the First World War breaks out, the Entente successfully baits the only remaining neutral great power Italy with territory from South Tyrol in the Alps all the way down to the Eastern Adriatic with the 1915 Treaty of London. This secret treaty gave birth to the Adriatic question. The minor Mediterranean bay would subsequently take disproportional geopolitical significance in the First World War that involved at one point personal interventions from US President Wilson. The Adriatic question became one of the most intractable territorial tangles of the Versailles peace conference, which was only provisionally resolved by the Treaty of Rappalo in 1920, where my PhD timeframe ends.

The Italo-South Slav boundary would continue to be a major source of rancour beyond the First World War. With Trieste under Italian control after the treaty of Versailles, the Adriatic port saw Europe’s first fascist act as an Italian mob burned down the Slovene cultural centre in 1920. The English historian and journalist A. J. P. Taylor suggested that “Italian rule over the South Slavs in the littoral had no parallel in Europe until the worst days of the Nazi dictatorship”. The interwar period saw South Slav resistance and nationalism begin to overlap with ideology, with South Slav organisations like TIGR forming one of the first anti-fascist organisations in Europe.

As the Second World War reached the Adriatic, the older ethnic mental moorings became enmeshed and intensified with the political binaries of the Second World War. In 1945, Trieste became the Berlin of the Adriatic, with a tense, undefined border between the Allies. According to the British historian Tony Judt, in 1945 the Third World War was most likely to break out on the Eastern Adriatic.
It has been population movements that have had the greatest impact on memory in the Adriatic region.

Population movements of Croats and Slovenes began immediately in the aftermath of 1918 as they fled harsh Italianisation measures. A few decades later, between the Italian capitulation in 1943 and 1954, many thousands of Italians moved from Yugoslav territory to Italy. Population movements have had a major effect on the memory of both Italians, Croats and Slovenes, which is commemorated in many monuments that seemed to consciously create competing realms of memory.

Through showing practical attempts of trans-border projects that attempt to come to terms with the past, I shall demonstrate the different methods used to deal with memory in the region. Numerous initiatives involving trans-border co-operation have emerged since the establishment of the Alpen-Adria regional co-operation organisation in 1978 that sought to bring together countries like Slovenia, Austria, Croatia and Italy. I shall argue that regionalisation initiatives have helped facilitate peacebuilding and reconciliation.

During the 1980s, a volunteer Austrian initiative organised the program *Friedenwege*/*Via delle Pace* (paths of peace) on the Alpine border that brought together youth through common construction projects. The volunteer project worked in symbiosis with the Kötschack-Mauthen open air museum on the Austro-Italian border in the Carnic Alps. It aimed at bringing together people from all the countries involved in combat during the First World War on the Isonzo front lying on the Austro-Italian border. This involved volunteers working closely together with historians, veterans and peace. Living together in the Alps, working together on reconstruction projects, and playing underground golf in the caverns dug by soldiers helped create strong bonds of friendship, solidarity and opportunities for cultural exchange.

On the Adriatic, a joint project of the Italian and Croatian president in 2010 brought together young musicians from Croatia, Italy and Slovenia to play together in a symphony orchestra on the 90th anniversary of the burning down of the Slovene cultural centre in Trieste.

Being a historian of the region, I have been inspired by concerts and caves to use comedy for a projects of peace and reconciliation. In the last part, I shall disseminate the results of my own initiative in 2015, involving the use of comedy improvisational theatre as a method of teaching history, building bridges and coming to terms with the past. Comedy improvisation, a genre of drama was originally used by my theatre group SPIKU (*Spiel mit den Kulturen*) to integrate asylum
seekers, refugees and other new arrivals to the Austrian capital Vienna. Having seen how improvisation can facilitate integration, I have developed improve theatre as a form of peacebuilding, youth participation and international bridge-building.

With improve comedy, one does not need to understand every joke to laugh with each other. Indeed, one does not need to understand every word to communicate. Strong communication skills improve people’s ability to develop into conscious, critical citizens. Our aim is to unite people of different backgrounds through acting and crying (with laughter) all together, on stage. Joint theatre projects offer a strong base for constructing common cultural co-ordinates due to theatre’s inherently communicative nature that allows for a strong base for peacebuilding.

I am currently in the final stages of organising an Alpen-Adria sponsored youth partnership exchange between Croatia, Italy, Austria and Slovenia for the centenary of the Treaty of Versailles in 2018. In the future, I hope to use comedy improvisation theatre to explore the past that does not pass in borderland communities ravaged by conflict and divided towns in the Balkans.

Jovana Vukcevic

Commodification of Collective Memory: Socialist Heritage between Disneyfication and Reconciliation

Whereas consumption, commodification and (to a certain extent) even disneyfication of the Western European heritage have already attracted considerable attention by a number of scholars, there were not many serious attempts to address complex practices of heritagization and commercialization of the post-socialist memorial sites. Therefore, a study on heritagization of communist “lieux de mémoire”, especially in terms of state negotiations of their tourist exploitation, would represent an original contribution to the ongoing debates on the representations of history and public uses of memory.

It may be argued that heritagization is a political process in itself, as it is precisely a state (power structure) that deliberately chooses specific landmarks of the specific past, tailored to comply with its current ideological framework. Therefore, after the fall of communism, East and Central European states did not lack the willingness to reinvent themselves and dissociate from the failed ideology by “cleansing” their heritage sites from everything referring to socialism. However, growing interest in remains of the socialist ideologies invited the
rehabilitation of the socialist memorial sites and the expansion of communist heritage tourism. It may be argued that the complex task of satisfying tourist demand for the stories of communism, without falling into its glorification, could have only been achieved by displacing historical reality of these heritage sites (by stripping them out of their original context, and by giving objects entertaining rather than educational character).

It might also be argued that these heritagization processes have had the most ambiguous outcome in the countries experiencing strong temporal discontinuity, such as former Yugoslavia, where the collapse of communism was also followed by a civil war and territorial, ethnic and identity reconfiguration. For the post-Yugoslav states, it was crucial not only to dissociate oneself from the socialism, but also from the former country, by creating the strong identity landmarks which provide a sense of national pride and unity. Faced with both the imperative of nation-building, and the burden of undesirable and ambivalent post-socialist heritage, power structures selectively determined which part of the socialist past was to be forgotten and which to be kept, but still, re-defined (displaced, re-contextualized and re-branded, and thus blunted of its symbolic meaning).

Illustrative of this is the commercial exploitation of Tito’s Blue Train, a symbol of socialist Yugoslavia, which has been nowadays rented for the celebration of marriages or birthday parties (Microsoft launched there its’ Windows 7 and Playboy Serbia traditionally organizes its’ extravagant birthday parties in the train). Similarly, Ceausescu’s “Casa Poporului”, after having become “Palatul Parlamentului”, ‘purged’ itself by offering to tourists a narrative which omits all connections with Ceausescu, emphasizing instead the contemporary uses of the building and its architectural values. Socialist past was recognized as a marketable heritage resource and similar processes were taking place all around Eastern Europe.

The objective of the study is to address the ways in which post-socialist states transformed socialist heritage and its narratives, creating sometimes a pastiche which is more a romantic fantasy than a historical fact. It will question how social dynamics, selective interpretation and commercial orientation transformed heritage into a veritable “historical bricolage”, a melting pot for historical memories. How the socialist heritage was rebranded order to become more appealing and more adequate for the mass consumption? To which extent, when “packaged and commercialised”, heritagized past ends up in kitsch and superficial mystification? What was the role of the communist heritage tourism in political reconstruction of national
memories? How historical authenticity of post-socialist heritage has been negotiated for the sake of the tourist competitiveness?

The purpose of the study is to identify and analyse the use of the socialist heritage as a commodity. It will assert the notion of heritage staged authenticity in tourism, in the context of its’, very often, kitsch aesthetics and carnavalesque celebrations, as well as its manipulative character when it comes to historical facts (oversimplification, misinterpretation, “consuming rather than engaging with the past”). Can this commodification and disneyfication of the heritage be interpreted as a way to avoid coming to terms with the past (German: 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung’), confronting personal or collective guilt, or maybe only admitting the flaws of that same socialist past and facilitating state and identity transformation? The paper argues that commodification which implies trivialization of the past, along with the absence of debates on these practices is a potential source of instability. While for the peacekeeping and long term stability of the region, it is indispensable to reconcile with the socialist past, the disneyfication process, as a way to escape from engaging in controversial process of past management, is only postponing the reconciliation with one’s own history. Therefore, the paper questions the role of the heritage in polishing the communist history, in reconciling memory and history and in peacemaking processes in post-conflict zones.
Panel III (October 1st)

“External Actors as Catalysts for Rapprochement”

Mariat Imaeva


It is estimated that between 3,000 and 5,000 people have disappeared in Chechnya since the beginning of the 1999 armed conflict. The vast majority of these people have disappeared after being detained by Russian military forces at the military checkpoints or during the mop up operations. The assessment conducted by the ICRC in 2007 showed that of the families assessed, in 90% of cases the missing were civilians, 6% were military, and 4%, police. Although the likelihood of the disappeared persons being alive is remote, their relatives generally cannot accept this; the ICRC’s research assessment of 100 families, shows that the majority of those interviewed believe that their relatives are alive (78%).

The absence of an official confirmation of death, as well as the absence of body means that people cannot organize funerals and go through the grieving process; instead they remain in a state of “frozen life”.

After unsuccessful attempts of searching for the disappeared at a domestic level many have turned for help to the regional human rights bodies, such as Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Court has handed down over 150 judgments on this issue since 2006 and has been acting as a source of moral justice and financial compensations for the victims, partially correcting the impunity in Chechnya. The practice of seeking help in Strasbourg is likely to continue if no serious measures are taken to establish the fate of disappeared persons. However, the effective implementation of the ECtHR decisions is hampered by an enduring stalemate at the national level. This means that a decade of successful litigation at the ECtHR has had little if any impact in solving cases of disappeared persons.

This research will aim to analyse what would the possibility of humanitarian exhumations create/entail in terms of new legalities and policies in relation to addressing cases of enforced disappearances in regions with unresolved conflict and no transitional justice mechanisms such as Chechnya. The main aim of this research is to investigate whether humanitarian exhumations can be an alternative way of solving cases of enforced disappearances in Chechnya and if so, what conditions need to be fulfilled for this to happen?
Specific aims are:

- To analyse current situation of enforced disappearances in Chechnya by examining national legislation and institutions and the extent to which these have been influenced by the ECtHR judgements;

- To research which of the three needs are most important for the relatives of disappeared persons: information, acknowledgement, accountability or a combination of these;

- Investigate successful cases of humanitarian exhumations (Cyprus, Balkans).

- To investigate whether humanitarian exhumations would be a welcome route in dealing with cases of enforced disappearances in Chechnya and identify the constraints and enablers of such approach (taken from perspective of relatives).

- Identify interim measures to ensure the possibility of future exhumation and identification work.

Humanitarian exhumations are exhumations done with the objective of identification and return of remains to relatives without legal proceedings. The advancement in forensic science such as the DNA identification of human remains enables to delink exhumations from truth recovery (testimony of a human witness), something which was not possible before. In Bosnia, the International Commission on the Missing Persons has exhumed almost two-thirds of the approximately 30,000 missing in the Balkan wars precisely because these exhumations are carried out primarily for humanitarian purposes (ICMP, 2011). Cyprus is another example where de-linkage of missing persons issue from political settlement of the conflict has facilitated exhumation and identification of missing persons (Kovras, 2012). Can the humanitarian exhumations in regions such as Chechnya, with no political solution of the conflict, break the prolonged silences and enable thousands of families to achieve closure with the loss of their loved-ones and might this, in turn, contribute to peace building and reconciliation?

To date, no empirical study exists on the role humanitarian exhumations can play in addressing enforced disappearances in Chechnya, even though the two wars have been sufficiently covered and there is a wealth of reports produced by various human rights organisations and academia on the human rights situation in the region as well as the ECtHR’s role in the region. However, there is lack of research about the possibility of humanitarian exhumations and the issue of de-linkage from political solution and wider human rights issues. The hypothesis of the study stems from presumption that after
many years of waiting, relatives might put more importance on information rather than accountability, as knowledge one way or the other might be preferable to the torment of uncertainty. Another presumption is that compliance with international obligations in search for missing persons is widely dependent on the political will, which often hinders for instance executions of numerous ECtHR judgements. For this reason conducting humanitarian exhumations is perhaps more realistic than conducting effective investigations. Humanitarian exhumations might represent a possible way to exit the impact of failure to provide (transitional) justice in the region.

Marina Zagar

Responsibility to Protect: Prosecution of Mass Atrocity Crimes and its Impact on Reconciliation and Peace

At the 2005 World Summit, the members of the United Nations unanimously endorsed the concept of Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter: R2P). A shift in the understanding of sovereignty – not as a license to control those within one’s borders, but rather as a set of obligations towards citizens, R2P stipulates that states have a primary responsibility to protect their population from mass atrocity crimes (core crimes) – namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Domestic courts have analogous, the primary responsibility to prosecute perpetrators of these crimes.

Norms regulating R2P, including the prosecution of core crimes, are important for the following reasons. First, core crimes are universally considered to be a threat to peace, security and the well-being of the state, its citizens, and consequently, the world. The most serious crimes of concern to the international community must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be ensured. Ending impunity of the perpetrators of core crimes is a moral, legal and political imperative. Secondly, impunity still exists. Many countries do not prosecute, as they are either unable or unwilling to do so.

Domestic courts, and ultimately, internationalized and international courts have a pivotal role in responding to R2P crimes, not only as tools to react, but also as tools of prevention, and as tools in post-conflict reconciliation and rebuilding efforts.

The question remains as to if the above mentioned courts are designed to have a real impact on reconciliation and peace in (post)conflict countries.

Courts and tribunals have stressed that the two main functions of sentencing perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes are retribution and deterrence. The other specific functions of international criminal trials
are functions of historical acknowledgment and truth-finding - a more restorative approach in international sentencing that better serves peace and reconciliation efforts. The right to the truth has emerged as a legal concept at the national, regional and international levels, and relates to the obligation of the state to provide information to victims, their families or even society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights. An important function of criminal trials can be to prevent the victims from seeking revenge. An implicit or explicit function of the international justice system is in fact expected to be the redressing of harm suffered by victims.

Researchers disagree on the impact that prosecutions can have on peace. For some theorists, the aims of justice and peace can contradict one another and, as a result, in its quest to establish justice, the courts and tribunals do not always serve the cause of peace. There are authors who claim that peace can exist without justice. Peace is enjoyed in countries such as Mozambique and Namibia, where reconciliation took place without trials. Some commentators argue that peace should come first, then justice. For some of the researchers, justice can be a danger for peace. „Fiat Justitia et Pereat Mundus?“ – As long as international justice is done, does it matter if peace is subverted, and the world perishes?

However, for a majority of theorists, any attempt at peace building which ignores justice is doomed to fail. It is important to highlight that prosecutions alone will not achieve lasting peace and it is recognised that other means of reconciliation are needed, together with prosecutions, to achieve lasting peace and justice in (post)conflict countries. Current Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, has argued that peace and justice are two sides of the same coin and can be pursued simultaneously. Compromising justice can be unsustainable; short-term peace may reinforce a culture of impunity, which could lead to the eruption of new conflicts in the future.

Giorgi Vardishvili

Peace Education Opportunities for Residents in Georgia’s Breakaway Regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

I call my research proposal according to the well-known phrase “No Justice, No Peace”. If one wants to achieve (positive) peace in conflict affected areas – that is my main premise – it can be done first and foremost through the establishment of justice. Unjust peace can never bring positive peace. Justice can be established and provided through
various tools, among them through peace education of the members of war affected communities.

In my research I think of three main ways to facilitate and promote education opportunities and perspectives in the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia:

1. Inviting foreign teachers and experts to the war affected places so that they provide quality lessons and lectures for local pupils and students;
2. On-the-job training of local teachers and professors in peace education broadening their skills in the respective teaching methods;
3. Enrolling local pupils and students in schools and universities abroad so that they have the high standard education opportunities there;

Since peace cannot be enforced, but is a rather complex process of step-by-step rapprochement, peace education is a very important construction element. By providing peace education to the communities affected by conflicts, it will be easier to talk about the possibility of establishing (transitional) justice paving the way to the bigger processes of peace building, reconciliation and conflict transformation.

I want to find out the linkage between peace education, justice and (eventually) positive peace. In doing so, I want to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of this linkage, possible challenges and how those challenges can be addressed. What I have done so far is the desk research on the current state of play. Different from Abkhazia, the situation is relatively complicated and tougher in South Ossetia.

In Abkhazia for example, the European Union has started implementation of a higher education project a long time ago already. The project implies sending EU scholars and teaching staff from EU-universities to deliver lectures at the Abkhaz University in the field of European Studies.

I am now looking at the possibilities and technical opportunities of facilitating similar projects in Abkhazia and starting them in South Ossetia.

In addition, I am exploring the opportunities of on-the-job training of local teachers and professors as well as education opportunities abroad for the students from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I have already done desk research on the latter.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the follow-up hostilities between the central government and secessionist groups in Georgia had a negative influence on the education system in breakaway Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Failure to timely improve and/or match the Soviet education system with the European standards as well as lack of both the political will and expertise to carry out tangible reforms in this field have resulted in poorly standardized education systems there. Consequently, the graduates of schools and higher education institutions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia often have difficulties in terms of compatibility with European education standards while continuing their undergraduate and/or postgraduate programs in European countries.

In addition to challenges with compatibility, the residents of breakaway regions face a number of technical problems concerning the admission into European educational institutions as well as travelling there. Higher educational institutions of the countries members of the 1961 Hague Convention request the education documents of applicants to be stamped with the Apostille of the country where the document was issued. Since Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not recognized as independent countries and they are neither members to the Bologna Process and the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) nor signatories of the 1961 Hague Convention, the de facto authorities cannot issue valid and internationally recognized education documents. Therefore, residents of the breakaway regions have two options: either to apply and get recognition of those documents in Tbilisi or try to get enrolled in higher education institutions of foreign countries through the help of Moscow. The option via Tbilisi is technically possible but the problem is that education documents issued in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali are often recognized just partially. It means the subjects learnt in breakaway regions do not convert into credits enough to be considered as valid education document. Besides, it takes additional time as per usual procedure, meaning those recognized documents need further validation and apostilization.

Furthermore, the residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia face difficulties to obtain study visas in European countries. For obvious political reasons they have two options: either to get the visa by means of being in possession of a Russian or a Georgian passport or of a Status Neutral Travel Document (SNTD). As the second and third options are not popular in the breakaway regions, they prefer to obtain visas with Russian passports. However, that is also connected to a number of complications. Residents of the respective regions have to travel to Moscow submitting fake papers proving that they are residents of the Russian Federation. Otherwise, foreign consulates in Moscow of the Schengen countries would reject them stating that Abkhazia and
South Ossetia are officially parts of Georgia and residents of these regions have to apply at the consulates in Tbilisi.

To sum up, the desk research I’ve already done has showed a number of challenges and obstacles, especially in education opportunities for Abkhaz and South Ossetian students abroad. I am going to explore more and find the ways of possible simplification of the existing obstacles in overseas education as well as to look into possible enlargement of projects like invitation of foreign professors and on-the-job training of local teachers.

Katarina Manojlovic

The European Union and its Policy of Conflict Resolution in the Eastern Neighbourhood - The Case of Georgia

Strategy, intensity of involvement and recourses of the European Union in treating non-European countries are diverse, depending essentially on the status of the country concerned and on the region in which it is located. In this paper the EU policies towards resolving the conflict in its Eastern Neighbourhood will be analysed, with a focus on the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The aim of this research is to examine the role of the EU as a peace actor in the conflict in Georgia, as well as its ability to influence problem resolution. In most observers’ opinion, the European Union is inclined to an approach whose ultimate goal is conflict transformation i.e. reaching a solution that would ensure stability in relations between the two conflicting sides in the future. The EU, although faced with numerous constraints on achieving this goal, can have a positive impact on the resolution of disputes through various projects under the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, and other forms of cooperation that affect the region, such as the Black Sea Synergy.

Another tendency that can be noticed is that the EU is more effective in crisis situations than in solving long-term conflicts, although it is precisely because of the involvement of the EU that the possibility of a large-scale armed violence has significantly decreased. The presence of the EU is of great importance for stability and peace building in Georgia, but the end of the conflict depends heavily on the cooperation with Russia, then with de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, of course, with the government of Georgia.

To prove this assertion, two levels of analysis will be used. One level will be focused on the crisis of 2008 and the second level regards the overall influence of the EU on the frozen conflict in Georgia that with certain changes still lasts. In this case, attention is drawn to various EU
The European Union is acting as a third actor that offers different conditions for cooperation to the said country, but this cooperation, besides numerous benefits includes also a number of conditions which the partner-state has to fulfil.

Thereby, the concept of Europeanization will be used as an analytical framework to monitor changes in domestic structures and policies in relation to changes in policies and practices at the EU level. Definitions of Europeanization vary, but what they all have in common is that they observe the Europeanization as the process of transfer of EU policies beyond its borders and the impact that EU integration has on the creation of national policies, discourses and identities. One of the aspects of the role of the EU is its influence on resolving conflicts in the countries with which it cooperates and it is therefore important to notice what kind of function the process of Europeanization has there. The European Union in that way has a range of instruments which it can use, among which are conditioning, social learning and passive coercion, whose effectiveness varies with respect to the current situation in the country, as well as its relations with the EU. In the case of Georgia, which has so far shown great interest in deepening relations with the EU, these instruments have a big impact on the transformation of its society and the state, but a problem arises in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, who see more advantages in cooperation with Russia. To analyse the behaviour of the EU in the conflict in Georgia, the theory of conflict resolution or different concepts, approaches, theories and methods that it includes will be also used. The theory of conflict resolution is defined as the set of multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary scientific approaches to solving the (complex) conflict, whose aim is their understanding and finding the best ways to overcome it. One of the most applicable in this case is the transcendent method of Johan Galtung.

After a detailed review and examination of the mechanisms that the EU is using in each phase of the conflict one should be able to answer the question, whether the EU is able to significantly influence the developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and whether its policy is able to motivate de facto authorities and civil society in these areas to get involved in programs that should contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Georgia as a whole. In addition, there will be an overview of all the policies that the European Union will use to ensure stability in this country. Finally, it is important to clarify the obstacles that the European Union faces in this process and explore possibilities for overcoming them.
As the problems in Georgia continue to exist, it is not possible to fully view the results of the EU engagement. However, the aim of my research is to trace, address and monitor the current situation in Georgia, examine the chances for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and recommend how the relationship between the conflicting parties could be improved.

Lutjona Lula

The impact of the EU on Political Parties in Serbia and Albania: Turning Nationalists into Peace Intermediators

South Eastern Europe has always been a vital region with continuous changes. After the fall of communism and the wars that accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia, countries in the region turned towards the European Union (EU). The transition, however, has been difficult. The challenges of rebuilding the state, reforming the economy and establishing the rule of law helped give rise to nationalist parties. Meanwhile, a lack of experience with democracy brought onto the political scene new parties whose orientation does not fit with either the traditional European left or right. After signing the SAA, the countries of the Western Balkans have a green light to move forward in the European integration process. This thesis will take into consideration the cases of Albania and Serbia in the light of internal and cross country comparison. Thereby, the thesis will address the puzzle of political party changes in Albania and Serbia in the light of EU integration process.

The Thessaloniki summit in 2003 was a crucial event for the countries of the region since it gave the Western Balkan states a plausible European perspective. The summit confirmed the importance of the Stabilisation Association Process. “The process and the prospects it offers serve as the anchor for reform in the Western Balkans, in the same way the accession process has done in Central and Eastern Europe.” 3 Albania signed the SAA in 2006, while Serbia signed the agreement in 2007.4 This events mark also the start of a range of internal processes in the countries.

My main argument is that the EU uses its leverage in candidate countries to influence the actions of political parties, thus boosting regional cooperation in the Balkans. How have domestic politics been transformed by the process? I focus on how political parties in Albania and Serbia have changed their agendas and their strategies since the signing of the SAA.

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and http://www.seio.gov.rs/serbia-and-eu/history.60.html
Main hypothesis
My main hypothesis is that “the EU integration process has a direct impact on changes in political parties’ orientations in candidate countries.” In my thesis, I will unpack the programmatic and internal changes of the main political parties in these countries and ask: How has the EU shaped domestic political parties in Serbia and Albania from 2004 to 2014? Do the parties adapt to EU changes and requests? Does these changes lead to more sectorial integration and cooperation within the region, despite the events of the past?
The paper uses a comparative approach within the countries and between the countries. I base my argument on the rationalist approach, which supports the idea that external influence and leverage of the European Union directly impact domestic actors, because for the latter the costs of not doing so are bigger. Taking into consideration that political parties are the most important institutions that enable democracies to achieve their representative role, this thesis argues that parties are the first and most impacted domestic actor during the European integration process. Therefore, it is important to understand how parties change their attitudes and agendas in response to EU leverage. The main research methods will be process tracing and also content analysis: I will closely read party agendas and programs and I will also use secondary resources such as academic papers and books published on the topic. As far as secondary resources are concerned, the backbone of the thesis will be a rationalist approach and the work published within it.

Zafar Saydaliev

Third Party Mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh: Mediation via the OSCE Minsk Group

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has brought many conflicts of different kinds to the Caucasus region. Among them, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which turned out to be the most intractable and prolonged dispute pending a solution for more than 20 years now, with an evidence of historical confrontation in the region. It has the properties of a modern global conflict in terms of territorial, ethnic and national dimensions, intertwined with a historical burden of ancient grievances. The dispute brought Azerbaijanis and Armenians into a violent conflict nearly two decades ago, and it is still considered unresolved.

Many major states and regional actors such as Iran, the US, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and the OSCE initiated third party mediation efforts in order to resolve the conflict. However, involvement of the UN was not possible at the outbreak of hostilities, since the conflict
started before the breakdown of the USSR. It mandated the CSCE to mediate the conflict, and by doing so, legitimized the CSCE claims for a primary role in solving the regional conflicts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was obviously a good chance for the OSCE to gain prestige by brokering a peace deal and thus become a conflict prevention organization. The OSCE negotiation group took the name “the Minsk group.”

However, many critics argue that the mediators were to blame for the delay of a peaceful settlement in this conflict, since they gave first priority to their own interests and had no leverage power and stalled the negotiation process. Today many researchers agree that mediation efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh turned out to be a failure and the efforts themselves prolonged conflict resolution. This leads to legitimate questions such as: do mediator’s motives affect the peace process as external powers with their own agendas become involved? Do external powers prioritize their own aims at the expense of finding a peaceful solution and ending the conflict? Is OSCE as a third party mediator contributes to the failure of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan? This work is an attempt to understand to what extent previous mediation efforts contributed to the failures in negotiation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, the research also leads to a debate on whether mediation necessarily works for the benefit of a peace agreement and in the light of these discussions, it will analyse the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s mediation efforts. The work will also provide the empirical data and historical view to the involvement of main players in the conflict resolution.

From the theoretical perspective of the international mediation, which will be elaborated more in detail in the research, it is assumed that the effectiveness and success of the OSCE Minsk Group depends on the following factors: a) previous relations between the conflicting parties; b) nature of problem; c) mediation strategies; d) powerful actors; and d) impartiality/or perceived bias of the mediators. The analysis of mediation efforts through the prism of these factors might shed some light to the effectiveness of the third party mediation in conflict situations.

While expanding on the success of the OSCE efforts from the angle of previous relations between the parties, one could imagine how the mediators are challenged by the parties that share a conflicting and complicated past for many centuries. Another aspect influencing the outcome of mediation is considered to be the nature of the dispute. In this case, vital and conflicting interests such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and the rights of peoples to self-determination are all affected among parties, which is why it is more difficult for the mediators to succeed. On the other hand, the OSCE is considered to be an actor
without particular interests in the region, but it is believed that the co-
chairs, Russia, USA and France have their own agendas when it comes
to the conflict settlement, which reflects on the aspect of powerful actors.
There is also a common view that geopolitical interests of the powerful
actors playing a key role during the mediation processes.

In terms of acceptance, the conflicting parties accepted the Minsk Group mediation due to the fact that it was not binding, so they had
nothing to lose. In addition to this, the nature of the OSCE decision-
making process which is based on consensus, allowed any party to block decisions. Therefore, the OSCE’s role as a mediator varied
between communicator and formulator during the negotiations. It can
be argued that it was successful at bringing parties together and
forming a communication platform. However, it was never enough to
to change the perceptions of the warring parties from zero-sum game to
a win-win solution mentality, which was essential for the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict since the demands of the parties were mutually
exclusive.

Nevertheless, considering all the facts above, that is to say the Minsk Group had to face a significant challenge until today and did not
accomplish any progress, one might argue that a third party mediation’s contribution to the failure of negotiations is worth analysing.

To be clear, the main argument here is not that the OSCE made a
wrong decision by intervening. In contrast, the OSCE’s power lies not
in enforcing a decision but in its prestige, its impartial demeanour and
international political skills. Although this assumption is quite
convincing, one should also note that after bringing the different sides
to the negotiating table, there is another crucial task to lead a round-
the-clock exercise for months, or perhaps even years in a successful
manner.

The attempt of this research is to build a comprehensive approach to
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by examining third party mediation
and its contribution to the failure of negotiations. My work indicates
that third party mediation starting from the early stages of the conflict
has highly contributed to the malfunction of negotiations between the
disputing parties, which also includes the mediation strategies used
and impartiality of mediators towards conflicting sides. Nonetheless,
it does not mean that third party mediation itself was solely
responsible for the whole failure.

At this stage, one of the limitations of this work could be the sole focus
on the third party actors. In fact, following on from the mediator’s
contribution to the failure, one must also take into account the
behaviours of the disputing parties and their domestic situation.
Giving a proper consideration to those issues might alter the conclusions of this work.
Panel IV (October 2\textsuperscript{nd})

“Russia in the Post-Soviet Sphere: Challenges and Prospects”

Ekaterina V. Klimenko

“Fostering Interethnic Tolerance”: An Efficient Reconciliation Strategy or (Re) Producing Racism?

Problem statement

The collapse of the Soviet Union – being at the same time the consequence and the reason of the resurgence of a number of nationalist movements - instigated a series of ethno-political conflicts in the Caucasus, including the one between Russia and Chechnya. Now, that the Chechen wars are over, the Russian-Chechen conflict seems to be resolved. The significant level of Caucasus-phobia, however, proves that Russian society is far from entering the reconciliation process: thus, in 2013 71\% of respondents supported the slogan “Enough to Feed Caucasus” [Общественное мнение – 2014. Таблица: 19.13.].

The strategy of tackling the problem of Caucasus-phobia, as well as other forms of xenophobia, chosen by decision makers in Russian Federation consists in fostering tolerance between ethnic, cultural, and religious groups that constitute Russian society. Since the early 2000s a number of state-run programs aimed at building up peaceful interethnic, intercultural, and interfaith relations have been elaborated and implemented. The high level of all forms of xenophobia (including the Caucasus-phobia), however, allows concluding that the “fostering tolerance” reconciliation strategy applied in Russia in order to overcome the consequences of the Russian-Chechen conflict remains ineffective.

What is the key reason of such ineffectiveness? May this reason be the type of content or, even more precisely, the type of discourse embedded in the content of state-run programs aimed at fostering tolerance and disseminated by the public discussions surrounding their elaboration and implementation? I was trying to answer these questions by analysing written legal texts: state-run programs aimed at “fostering interethnic, intercultural and interfaith tolerance” elaborated and implemented in the years 2000-2015.
The methodology of this research is based on the recognition of the ability of discourse – considered as a set of forms of representation, codes, conventions and habits of language that produce specific fields of culturally and historically located meanings [Fiske, 1987] – to predetermine the way we perceive reality. The use of language, influencing beliefs and interaction, mediates our access to reality and contributes to reproducing (or resisting) certain social practices, including discriminatory ones [Van Dijk, 1997]. Relationship between “particular discursive events and the situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded” is dialectical, which means, “discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it” [De Cillia, Reisigl, Wodak, 1999: 157].

As far as the social reality is not only represented but also constituted by the use of language [Sapir, 1949; Whorf, 1972], the problem of discourse control evolves. The predominant discourse – providing legitimization of the present state of things as being natural, unavoidable and self-evident and thus framing the hegemonic cultural order [Hall, 1973] – produces a certain social and political context. The concept of “official nomination” [Bourdieu, 1984] is used to define the specificity of legal texts that consists in their ability not only to - while reflecting ideologies, norms and values shared by their authors - (directly) predetermine actions of social agents and (explicitly) constitute social practices, but to produce the widely recognized (and legitimized) definitions of social reality.

My research objective was to perform the analysis of written legal texts dedicated to the issue of fostering interethnic tolerance, in order to elicit which type of discourse is (re)produced in these texts; what topics, discursive strategies and linguistic devices are applied by their authors to perform such a (re)production; how the implicit meaning of these texts relate to the explicit goals proclaimed by their authors.

The results of the research: During the research topics (the substance of tolerance; tolerance as threats’ neutralizer; tolerance as a resource; tolerance and intolerance: the past and the present; instruments to foster tolerance), discursive strategies (securitization; culturalization of the social; ignoring diversity; randomization of the problem; idealization of the past) and semantic means (nebulosity, vagueness) employed in the analysed legal texts have been identified. Approaches applied while implementing these programs (“enlightening” and “ethnographic”) have been defined.

The “fostering tolerance” reconciliation strategy adapted in Russia is embedded in a broader social context that consists in “ethnitisation”
of the social and is related to two “mistakes” of which one may be called “terminological” and the other – “methodological”. These are the understanding of the term “nation” as an ethno-linguistic or ethnocultural substance; the essentialist conception of the phenomenon of nation specific for Russian political, media, educational and academic discourses. These “mistakes” embody in the practices of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity management that is based on two statements: for the survival of an ethnolinguistic, ethno-cultural or ethnoreligious group “its own” nation-state is needed; the stability of a nation-state requires ethnolinguistic, ethno-cultural and ethnoreligious homogeneity.

The texts of the state-run programs aimed at fostering tolerance reproduce (while the practice of their implementation is constituted by) the specific type of discourse. Its important traits are: considering ethnic groups as homogenous; regarding members of these groups as representatives of a certain “culture” that is deemed a never altering substance; esteeming “cultural differences” – perceived as a distance between cultures that may be observed and measured – as obstacles to social interaction; representing all sorts of communication difficulties in terms of culture. It is this type of discourse that contributes to disseminating the Caucasus-phobia (as well as other forms of xenophobia) in Russia. It is at the same time the contradiction between the implicit meaning of the analysed legal texts and the goals proclaimed explicitly by their authors that is the key prerequisite for the ineffectiveness of “fostering tolerance” as the reconciliation strategy applied in Russia in order to overcome the consequences of Russian-Chechen conflict.

The second phase of the research will consist in performing a discourse analysis of media coverage (written media texts) of the process of elaboration and implementation of the state-run programs aimed at fostering tolerance.

References


Eshgin Tanriverdi

“An Analysis of Russian Near Abroad Policy Towards the South Caucasus Conflicts on the Basis of the Ethic”

Central Hypothesis

The paper aims at analysing Russian Policy towards the South Caucasus conflicts on the basis of two normative theories which are Utilitarianism and its opposite: “Ethical” Egoism. Utilitarianism is one of the most powerful and persuasive approaches to normative ethics in the history of philosophy. Though there are many varieties of the view, utilitarianism is generally held to be the view that the morality right action is the action that produces the most good, which was the leading normative ethic in the Soviet Union. The theory is a form of consequentialism: the right action is understood entirely in terms of the consequences produced.

Nevertheless, after the collapse of the Soviet Union things were very volatile in Russia’s policy. Offensive Russia’s utilitarian policy was distinguished from egoism in terms of consequences. On utilitarian Russia’s view one ought to maximize the overall good –that is, consider the good of others as well as one’s own good. During the Soviet Union, utilitarianism as a policy generally claims that good acts are those which maximize pleasure and minimize pain. In comparison “Ethical” Egoism in current Russia is the ethical position that moral agents ought to do what is in their own self-interest. It differs from psychological egoism, which claims that people can only act in their
self-interest. Ethical egoism also differs from rational egoism, which holds that it is rational to act in one’s self-interest, because some might get confused by saying that Russia does its self-interest and self-interest itself is a normative ethic.

Utilitarianism was a popular philosophy in Russia during the 1860s; the theory could be summarized with the phrase “The ends justify the means”. In Russia, there is literature that does the job of philosophy. Ethical dilemmas and moral choices are widely discussed in Russia’s novels of the 19th century, less so in philosophical works. As a case in point Fyodor Dostoyevsky, with all the power of his artistic gifts, demonstrated in his novels that a single person and society cannot build happiness upon the suffering of another. Currently Russia promotes the same vision, whereas this essay will discuss its policy while concluding that it follows an opposite ethical theory.

Current state of Research of Russian policy towards the South Caucasus

The South Caucasus region with its various frozen conflicts has particularly recently gained an enormously significant role in the research area of Peace and Conflict Studies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the paths of the three South Caucasian republics had been different, meaning Armenia being dependent on Russia, Azerbaijan pursuing a policy of independence regarding external players, and Georgia assuming a pro-Western, anti-Russian position. As a result, Russia became offensive with its irrevocable decision of not taking off its hands particularly over the South Caucasus region, even more since it is considered as a buffer zone between the Russian North Caucasus and the Islamic world and an area in which Russia feels threatened by the possible rising of another regional power, such as the EU and Turkey.

Russia’s strategy in the South Caucasus is clear: creating satellite states, controlling the extraction and transportation of energy resources, exerting economic influence, moderating armed conflicts and keeping the region out of Western influence through keeping Caspian pipelines under its control and impeding the diversification of energy resources towards Europe.

Post-Soviet or post-imperial Russia does not experience a rebirth as a nation-state, like for example democratic Germany after World War II or Kemalist Turkey. Rather, Russia’s strategy is to use military power to protect its natural sphere of influence. Russia thus recognizes the downfall of the empire, but wants to remain a great power. So, the
imperial élan has gone, however Russian establishment defines their country as a “great power”. Obviously, adopting a new role after half a century as an empire, seventy years as an ideological warrior and over forty year during the Cold War period as military superpower is not easy for Russia. Russia will never be able to restore the Soviet Union. Russian Federation today is in a position of post-empire rather than new-empire.

In its offensive foreign policy Russia played a major role in fuelling South Caucasus conflicts. Certainly, Russia was only a hidden actor in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflict, therefore there were no clear findings to condemn Russia’s act. On the contrary Russia’s biased and active position played a major role during the Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict. Unfortunately, Russia never admits this, instead it recently started to act as a mediator and security stabilizer in terms of reconciliation.

**Basic line of Argumentation**

In the light of the aforesaid, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has obviously pursued an aggressive policy towards the South Caucasus states in order to retain hegemonic power in the region. Post-utilitarian Russia became very aggressive and egoistic by using clear armed forces, basically abolishing international law. In the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts Russia had managed to camouflage itself, whereas the same attempt proved futile in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Recently, Russia started to be paternalistic and conventional in terms of establishing peace and security in the South Caucasus region. Unfortunately, it is quite obvious that Russia wants to exert hegemonic domination over the respective states, curbing any external relationship of these states. Russia acts as security stabilizer in the region but delicately imposes its egoistic policy, impeding sustainable peace and political independence in the region. Certainly, this is very much against Russia’s political paradigm. Therefore, Russia doesn’t get any political endorsement and there is very high alienation in the international politics. Nevertheless, post-utilitarian Russia struggles to retain its lost image, and although ethical egoism is the opposite of utilitarianism in normative theory in terms of analysing Russia’s current policy, there is a vivid dispute in this regard. To see Ethical Egoism in Russian policy towards South Caucasus conflicts is arguably debatable, whether there is ethic on that or the policy is pure egoistic.
Fernando Avakian

Salafist Groups in the North Caucasus: Changes in the Understanding of the Chechen Conflict:

The North Caucasus region is one of the most heterogeneous and diverse areas when it comes to ethnicity and religion. Throughout history, these ethnic groups coexisted with variable degrees of tension, each of them being in turn traversed by complex clan relations. Even though the current situation reflects some stability, there are still underlying tensions and conflicts, many of them related to the irruption of Salafism, which has made the pre-existing intricate ethnic relations even more complex.

With regards to the russo-chechen conflict, several authors highlight the fact that during USSR’s last days, ethno-nationalism was the main drive for secession within the Chechen elites, whose primary goal was political independence. In fact, separatism along ethnic lines was widespread in the region as a whole. Nevertheless, between the First (1994-1996) and the Second (1999-2000) Chechen War, the incentives and the objectives of the actors evolve, mainly given by the consolidation of armed Salafist groups. During and after the first war, many foreign Salafist combatants who had previously fought in Afghanistan moved to Chechnya, as they considered the ongoing struggle as part of the international Djihad. Thus, the understanding of the conflict begins to move to the religious field, beyond nationalist claims. That is why, according to Larzillière, the very nature of the conflict has changed, evolving from ethnic-nationalism to Islamic-nationalism.

Indeed, the link between ethnicity, religion and political claims, especially between Islam and national independence, is not new. During mid XIX century, the Imam Shamil built a united front against tsarist expansionism through the Caucasian Immate, where different tribes and clans were merged. The unifying factors for this alliance were the Islamic faith (in the traditional soufi form) and the resistance against the Russian Empire.

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However, the difference lays in the fact that Salafism, a non-native form of Islam in the Caucasus, imposed a completely different understanding of the conflict. Salafist organizations followed their own agenda, seeking to create a political entity under the Sharia that transcends Chechen borders, regardless ethnic differences. And even if they are not fully integrated in practice with vaster international Salafist networks and their issues at stake remained local, these radical Islamic groups linked the Chechen national cause to a worldwide Djihad.7

This change can be observed not only by analysing the strategic goals of the diverse actors, but also in how they refer to the conflict in their discourses. In my current research I’m trying to determine how the discourses of the three main actors in the conflict – the Russian federal government, Salafist organizations and local Chechen governments– have reflected the above-mentioned changes in the nature of the struggle during the period between the Chechen independence declaration (1991) and the last terrorist attacks in many Caucasian republics and other Russian cities (2005-2007). Special attention is given to the way all sides involved shaped their discourses after the emergence of djihadist organizations, initially formed by foreign combatants.

For that purpose, I focus on several semiotic events from Russian leaders, Chechen rebels (nationalists and Salafists) and the Chechen formal governments carrying out a discourse analysis. Press releases, videos, public statements and interviews from the period between 1991 and 2007 are taken into account. Given the importance of reflecting this mutation of nature, I will specifically focus on the change from Russian to Arabic as the language used by Salafists to communicate and justify their actions during and after the Second Chechen War.

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7 This may be changing given the relations between Chechen radical groups and ISIS. However, for the moment there is little information about Chechen involvement in Syria.
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